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But the Constitution does not belong to judges, as a mystery intelligible only to 
a priestly caste, and it does not belong to political activists, as a set of incendiary 
talking points. It belongs to the people. It is our responsibility to judge the Court, 
and it is our judgment that must be decisive in the end.1
This article explores the history of Supreme Court Justices’ papers and their status as 
private property. It discusses questions of access, the public’s interest in understand-
ing the Court and its decisions, and the effect of the Justices’ papers on scholarship 
and popular research. Several options for encouraging greater openness are proposed. 
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Introduction
¶1 Following the unexpected death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in 
early 2016,2 it quickly came to the attention of legal scholars that Justice Scalia had 
not designated a repository for his papers before his passing.3 No law governs the 
preservation of federal judges’ papers produced in the course of their work as 
employees of the United States.4 As a result, the fate of Scalia’s papers was left in the 
hands of his family, who were free to do virtually anything with them. Papers of 
other Supreme Court Justices have been destroyed, lost, or heavily restricted. We 
now know that the Scalia family has chosen Harvard Law Library as the repository 
for the papers, but they have placed restrictions on them that will delay access to 
many of the papers for an indeterminate (but likely not short) period based on the 
lifespans of Scalia’s colleagues. This delay will frustrate scholars and other research-
ers, and it will hamper further insight into the Court at a time when it appears to 
be undergoing an ideological shift further to the right. Justice Scalia spent twenty-
nine years on the Court participating in many decisions that have shaped modern 
American society and jurisprudence. As Professor Gerard Magliocca of Indiana 
University noted, “Everyone will be dying to see [Scalia’s papers].”5 
¶2 For the American public as well as scholars of law, history, and government, 
the papers of all Supreme Court Justices are of vital importance.6 The insights 
gleaned from these papers contribute to biographies, histories, and legal critiques. 
Our understanding of the Constitution, our government, the Court, and its deci-
sions is enriched by access to the thinking of the Justices. In turn, this knowledge 
informs our views on our laws and social order and helps shape the future of our 
legal, political, and even moral culture. 
 2. Jamie Gangel et al., Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court Justice, Dies at 79, CNN, Feb. 15, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/13/politics/supreme-court-Justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/index 
.html [https://perma.cc/V898-49WQ].
 3. Tony Mauro, The Fate of Scalia’s SCOTUS Papers Is Uncertain, Nat’l L.J., Feb. 22, 2016, at 19. 
 4. In this article, I use “papers” and “working papers” interchangeably to mean the documents 
created in the chambers of the Supreme Court Justices in the course of their government work. 
The public’s interest is limited to the Justices’ work as jurists and government employees, not their 
personal lives. Thus, I draw a distinction between private papers and working papers or, in some 
parlance, “public papers.”
 5. Mauro, supra note 3, at 19.
 6. See infra ¶¶ 27–48; see also Stephen Wermiel, Using the Papers of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: 
A Reflection, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 499 (2012–2013). 
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¶3 Despite, or perhaps because of, high interest in these papers, many Justices 
who have donated their papers in the past seventy-five years or so have restricted 
access to the collections. These restrictions generally keep the papers closed until a 
certain amount of time has passed. This period may be a few years (rarely) or 
decades (usually), but the general trend is toward lengthy periods of time.7 This 
raises an important question: what perspective can we as librarians and archivists 
bring to this tug of war between access and privacy, two concepts that our profes-
sion holds in high esteem?
¶4 This article explores the tension between access and privacy presented by the 
Justices’ papers, and it proposes changes that will balance the public’s interest in open 
government and insight into our legal system with respect for the confidentiality 
desired by the Court. Paragraphs five through twenty-six set forth the root of the 
problem—that the Supreme Court Justices continue to have personal ownership of 
their working papers, resulting in idiosyncratic retention and access decisions. Para-
graphs twenty-seven through thirty-four explore the public’s interest in access to the 
Justices’ papers because of the Court’s impact on our society, the nature of the Court 
and its operations, and its politicization. Paragraphs thirty-five through forty-eight 
investigate the effects of access on scholarship. Paragraphs forty-nine through seventy-
one weigh the Justices’ privacy interests, and paragraphs seventy-two through eighty-
nine offer proposals for change. The appendix lists the largest collection of papers for 
each Justice who served on the Court in the twentieth or twenty-first century along 
with access restrictions on those collections at the time they were established.
The Problem: Justices Set the Rules on Access to Their Working Papers
¶5 The working papers of all federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices, 
are considered personal property rather than public property. No federal statute 
provides for the disposition of these papers. Neither does any policy of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. Justices’ staff and clerks can help organize the 
papers but can make no decisions about retention or disposition. The National 
Archives cannot accept the Justices’ papers as part of the court records, and no 
court funds are available for preservation and disposition. The papers of the Justices 
and other federal judges are not provided even with temporary storage in federal 
records centers.8 
¶6 The lack of law or policy providing for retention of Justices’ papers leaves 
plenty of room for the Justices to be idiosyncratic with their papers. Prior to the 
1930s, the disposition of Supreme Court Justices’ papers was, to put it simply, not a 
matter of particular concern to anyone. Some Justices destroyed their papers, 
though their motivations in doing so are unknown, but most left them in the hands 
of their heirs or gifted them to an archive with no restrictions. 
¶7 As evidenced in this article’s appendix, this attitude started to change with 
Justice Louis Brandeis. Brandeis began turning over his papers to the University of 
Louisville in 1936, three years before he stepped down from the bench in 1939. 
According to internal letters at the university, at least some portion of these papers 
 7. See Appendix. 
 8. Fed. Judicial History Office, A Guide to the Preservation of Federal Judges’ Papers 1 (2d 
ed. 2009).
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was to be kept closed, except by special permission, during the lifetime of Bernard 
Flexner, a lawyer and friend of Brandeis who facilitated the arrangements for the 
donation with the university.9 Flexner died in 1945, only four years after the pass-
ing of Justice Brandeis. 
¶8 Justice Felix Frankfurter joined the Court the year Brandeis retired but was 
a longtime correspondent of Brandeis. Apparently, he was not pleased with 
Brandeis’s gift of papers to the University of Louisville. According to legend, shortly 
after Brandeis’s death in 1941, “Frankfurter went to Louisville, stormed into the 
library, asked for the file labelled ‘Frankfurter,’ and took nearly everything out of it. 
‘These are my papers, and I’m taking them back,’ he told the librarian as he walked 
out the door, sheaf in hand.”10 
¶9 When disposing of his own papers, Justice Frankfurter required that each 
document he gave to the Library of Congress be kept closed until sixteen years after 
the date of the document’s creation. The papers that he donated to Harvard Law 
Library were closed except by special permission from a three-person panel of 
close friends and colleagues of Frankfurter’s.11 
¶10 Some of Justice Frankfurter’s peers seem to have shared his reservations 
about public access to their papers. Hugo Black, who served on the Court from 
1937 to 1971, had many of his papers, particularly case files, destroyed. He was very 
private about his life and work and, according to one historian, his children 
referred to the burning of his papers as “Operation Frustrate the Historians.”12 
When the Sherman Minton papers, Stanley Reed papers, and Fred Vinson papers 
were donated in the 1970s, they were all given with restrictions that shielded the 
papers from public use for a time. 
¶11 This trend continued with Justice Potter Stewart gifting his papers to Yale 
University when he retired in 1981. He stipulated that the papers remain closed 
until the retirement of all those who served with him on the Court. This occurred 
in 2010 when Justice John Paul Stevens retired, twenty-nine years after the retire-
ment of Justice Stewart. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor took the same approach as 
Justice Stewart when she gave her papers to the Library of Congress, tying access 
to the retirement of all those who served with her on the Court.13 It will likely be 
 9. Letter from J.N. Lott, Dean of the Univ. of Louisville Sch. of Law, to Dr. E.W. Jacobsen (Dec. 
4, 1945) (on file with author). It refers to Bernard Flexner, who was a friend of Brandeis and through 
whom donation of the papers was arranged. In the letter, Lott tells Jacobsen that “[d]uring Mr. Ber-
nard Flexner’s lifetime it was understood that the Brandeis papers were not to be examined by anyone 
without the consent of either Mr. Flexner or some member of the Brandeis family.” Jacobsen may have 
been a member of the law faculty, in that the inside address for him is merely “Law School Building” 
and the printed heading on the letter indicates it is an “Interdepartmental Communication.” 
 10. Jill Lepore, The Great Paper Caper, New Yorker, Dec. 1, 2014, at 32, 33. 
 11. According to information received from Harvard Law Library, there are no restrictions on 
the collection now. 
 12. Lepore, supra note 10, at 32. 
 13. It is interesting to note that the Library of Congress’s website includes a page discussing 
what information the Manuscript Division offers about women Justices, judges, and attorneys. The 
page opens with: “As suggested by the Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg collections 
described elsewhere, the papers of Supreme Court justices and appeals court judges contain a wealth 
of information on federal case law relating to women of all classes, races, and regions.” See American 
Women: Manuscript Division, Libr. of Cong., https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awmss5 
/supreme.html [https://perma.cc/PA6W-YYN3]. The page also discusses what is found in the collec-
tions of many of the male Justices who preceded O’Connor and Ginsburg. 
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many years yet until the opening of her papers to the public since she served with 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Roberts. 
¶12 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Supreme Court papers, held at the Hoover Insti-
tute at Stanford University, are being opened on a rolling basis. According to the 
terms of his gift, the papers remain closed during the lifetimes of the Justices who 
served with him, but portions open as his former colleagues die. At this time, the 
papers from 1975 forward are closed since Justice Stevens is still very much alive. 
When his life ends, the next portion of Rehnquist’s papers14 will open. This process 
will continue for an unknown number of years. Still-living Justices who served with 
Rehnquist include Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer. 
¶13 Justice Scalia’s judicial papers, now held at the Harvard Law Library, will 
open on a similar rolling basis as judges and Justices with whom he served die. This 
means the earliest any papers specific to Supreme Court cases will open is after the 
deaths of both Justices Stevens and O’Connor. Given the relative youth of Justice 
Thomas, it could be many years before any of Scalia’s papers regarding cases after 
1991, some of which are already more than 25 years old, are available. The youngest 
Justice with whom Scalia served is Justice Kagan. Born in 1960, she could easily live 
another thirty or more years. 
¶14 Justice David Souter took the most restrictive approach to date, short of 
destruction. Upon his retirement in 2009, Justice Souter gifted his papers to the 
New Hampshire Historical Society with the restriction that they not be made avail-
able to the public until fifty years after his death. At the time of this writing, Justice 
Souter is 78 years old; we will be well into the latter half of the twenty-first century 
before anyone has access to his papers. 
¶15 In contrast, Justice Harry Blackmun, who retired in 1994 at the age of 85, 
took a much less restrictive approach than his peers. The bequest of his papers to 
the Library of Congress kept the collection closed for only five years after his death, 
which occurred in 1999. When his papers were opened in 2004, three Justices with 
whom Blackmun had served were still at the Court: O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Ste-
vens. No harm to his colleagues ensued, and the scholarship on Blackmun has 
benefited considerably from timely access to his collection.15
¶16 By far the most controversial (at least at the time) access decision came 
about when Thurgood Marshall died in 1993, just two years after his retirement 
from the Supreme Court. He had donated his papers—a sizable collection of more 
than 170,000 items—to the Library of Congress. His deed of gift indicated that the 
papers were to remain closed during his lifetime. Upon his death, the collection was 
to be “made available to the public at the discretion of the Library.”16
 14. This is likely to be the papers from 1975 to 1981, when Justice O’Connor joined the Court. If 
Stevens outlives O’Connor, the opened papers would include those through 1988 when Justice Ken-
nedy joined the Court.
 15. See infra ¶¶ 39–48.
 16. Instrument of Gift, Thurgood Marshall to Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Oct. 24, 
1991, reprinted in Public Papers of Supreme Court Justices: Assuring Preservation and Access, Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Regulation and Government Information of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 69 (1993) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
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¶17 James Billington, then Librarian of Congress, opened the Marshall papers 
to the public shortly after the Justice’s death.17 In May 1993, journalists from the 
Washington Post ran a three-day series of articles drawing on information con-
tained in Marshall’s papers.18 Other journalists quickly followed suit.19 It was not 
long before Marshall’s former colleagues on the Court expressed their displeasure 
with the library’s decision to release the papers. 
¶18 The controversy over Marshall’s papers prompted a subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs to convene a hearing on June 11, 1993, 
less than three weeks after the first article had appeared in the Washington Post. 
The hearings were conducted by Senators Joe Lieberman and Thad Cochran and 
included testimony from prominent figures at the Library of Congress, the press, 
the Supreme Court Review, and the Society of American Archivists.20 Participants 
generally agreed on a range of issues regarding judicial papers, many of which 
echoed the earlier Public Documents Commission Report issued in 1977 in the 
wake of Watergate:21
•	 Preservation of and access to Justices’ papers are important public interests.
•	 Private ownership has allowed the Justices to be idiosyncratic in placing 
access restrictions on their collections of papers. These restrictions have, 
for the most part, become more severe in the past few decades, and these 
restrictions limit the public’s understanding of the Court. 
•	 Allowing for the passage of some period of time between a Justice’s 
retirement and the opening of his or her papers is reasonable and even 
advisable, but that period should not be excessive. Justice Blackmun’s 
papers serve as an instructive example here. They opened five years after 
his death, which was ten years after his retirement from the Court. Unlike 
the release of Justice Marshall’s papers, the release of Justice Blackmun’s 
papers caused no backlash from the Justices, nor did the restriction up 
until that point cause an outcry among scholars. Ten years seems to have 
been, at the very least, good enough for everyone. 
•	 Once the papers are open, discrimination as to who can access them (e.g., 
giving access to “serious” scholars but not to journalists or those with only 
a passing curiosity) should not be allowed.
•	 It would be helpful to know more about the Justices’ confidentiality 
concerns, but in light of the separation of powers doctrine and the 
 17. See Larry Weimer, An Embarrassment of Riches: Access and the Politics of Processing Congres-
sional Collections, in An American Political Archives Reader 337 (Glenn Gray et al. eds., 2009). 
 18. Benjamin Weiser & Joan Biskupic, Secrets of the High Court; Papers Afford a Rare Glimpse 
of Justices’ Deliberations, Wash. Post, May 23, 1993, at A1; Benjamin Weiser & Bob Woodward, Roe’s 
Eleventh-Hour Reprieve; ‘89 Drafts Show Court Poised to Strike Abortion Ruling, Wash. Post, May 23, 
1993, at A1; Joan Biskupic, How an Era Ended in Civil Rights Law, Wash. Post, May 24, 1993, at A1; 
Fred Barbash & Joan Biskupic, 1st Black Justice Unyielding in Rights Crusade, Wash. Post, May 25, 
1993, at A1.
 19. Articles appeared that same week in USA Today, the New York Times, the Philadelphia 
Inquirer, the Los Angeles Times, the Kansas City Star, the Dallas Morning Post, and the Chicago Tri-
bune, among others. 
 20. See generally Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 1.
 21. See Nat’l Study Comm’n on Records & Documents of Fed. Officials, Final Report of the 
National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials 6 (1977) [herein-
after Commission Final Report].
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traditions that surround the Court, it is not clear what, if anything, 
Congress ought to do about regulating preservation and access.22 
¶19 In the end, the hearing resulted in general agreement that Congress should 
not respond to calls to override James Billington and close the Marshall papers. 
Justice Marshall’s Instrument of Gift entrusted discretion to the Librarian of Con-
gress, and it would set a bad precedent if this entrustment were violated from the 
perspective of both archivists who implement donor agreements and current and 
future Justices who want their donative wishes followed.23 The hearing did not 
result in any action. 
¶20 In the end, the controversy seemed largely unnecessary. All in all, the news-
paper articles following the opening of Justice Marshall’s papers showed that the 
Court was doing its job and functioning well given the independent nature of the 
Justices. Yes, there was debate and disagreement among the Justices, and sometimes 
Justices would change their minds, but that is how the Court is supposed to work. 
¶21 The downside is that Marshall’s and Billington’s decisions, which appeared 
to favor access, struck a blow to transparency in the end. As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
made clear at the Senate hearing, the Justices were not pleased, and those Justices 
who were serving at the time but have since retired have placed more severe restric-
tions on their archives than was typical prior to Marshall. It seems that the release 
of Justice Marshall’s papers damaged the relationship of trust between the Justices 
and archivists, and that relationship has not yet recovered. Moving forward, if we 
want to encourage upper limits on restrictions, we need to ensure that lower limits 
exist as well and that records remain closed for a given time. 
¶22 We also need to recognize the risk that encouraging greater openness may 
cause Justices to simply destroy more of their papers rather than hazard unwanted 
scrutiny. This is a risk familiar to archivists.24 In her work on the balancing acts 
performed by archivists, Judith Schwarz notes that “[a]mid the complex motives of 
donors, there is often a desire to establish a favorable historical image of the record-
creating institution, family, or person. That desire can lead to a destruction of some 
materials before any are donated . . . .”25 In the context of the working papers of the 
Supreme Court Justices, perhaps the desire to create a favorable impression would 
actually countervail the urge to avoid scrutiny through destruction. Supreme Court 
Justices who destroyed their working papers years ago seem a bit peevish to us now, 
having denied posterity the records created when they held the highest judicial 
position in the nation. Meanwhile, the available collections have given rise to 
greater interest in the Court, greater understanding of the Justices, and greater 
respect for the difficult work they do. In short, the Justices leave far better impres-
sions when their papers are available within a reasonable time after retirement 
(although not too soon) than when they are destroyed. 
¶23 The disparities between the Justices’ choices and the extremes to which the 
ad hoc approach can go, as evidenced by the Marshall and Souter papers, lend cre-
dence to Professor Kathryn Watts’s assertion that the private property model 
 22. See generally Senate Hearing, supra note 16.
 23. Testimony of Anne R. Kenney, Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 21–22.
 24. See Judith Schwarz, The Archivist’s Balancing Act: Helping Researchers While Protecting Indi-
vidual Privacy, 79 J. Am. Hist. 179 (1992). 
 25. Id. 
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applied to Justices’ (and judges’) papers “has proven ill-equipped to balance the 
many competing interests at stake, ranging from calls for governmental account-
ability and transparency on the one hand, to the judiciary’s independence, confi-
dentiality, collegiality, and integrity on the other.”26 Instead it has resulted in unpre-
dictable and idiosyncratic disposition of some of the most historically valuable 
papers produced by employees of the U.S. government. Remarkably, the idiosyn-
crasies do not even necessarily end when the papers are donated. With the stroke 
of a pen, a Justice can change his or her restrictions at any time.27 
¶24 An individual Justice’s ability either to place severe restrictions or to ignore 
privacy concerns with restrictions that are too loose puts archivists in the position 
of flouting the general ethic of their profession—access balanced by privacy, not 
access subsumed by privacy. Furthermore, a donor’s ability to change restrictions 
on a whim frustrates the ethic of access that is both determinable and equitable. 
The following excerpts from the Society of American Archivists’ Core Values State-
ment are indicative of the Society’s ethics as to access: 
Access and Use: . . . Although access may be limited in some instances, archivists seek 
to promote open access and use when possible. Access to records is essential in personal, 
academic, business, and government settings, and use of records should be both welcomed 
and actively promoted. Even individuals who do not directly use archival materials benefit 
indirectly from research, public programs, and other forms of archival use, including the 
symbolic value of knowing that such records exist and can be accessed when needed.
Accountability: By documenting institutional functions, activities, and decision-making, 
archivists provide an important means of ensuring accountability. In a republic such 
accountability and transparency constitute an essential hallmark of democracy. Public lead-
ers must be held accountable both to the judgment of history and future generations as well 
as to citizens in the ongoing governance of society. Access to the records of public officials 
and agencies provides a means of holding them accountable both to public citizens and to 
the judgment of future generations.28
 26. Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1665, 1665 (2013).
 27. See, e.g., Ruth Panofsky & Michael Moir, Halted by the Archive: The Impact of Excessive Archi-
val Restrictions of Scholars, 37 J. Scholarly Pub. 19 (2005).
 28. SAA Core Values Statement and Code of Ethics, Soc’y of Am. Archivists, https://www2.
archivists.org/statements/saa-core-values-statement-and-code-of-ethics#core_values [https://perma.
cc/7KXT-FP2P]. In its Code of Ethics for Archivists, the SAA also states that
[r]ecognizing that use is the fundamental reason for keeping archives, archivists actively promote 
open and equitable access to the records in their care within the context of their institutions’ mis-
sions and their intended user groups. They minimize restrictions and maximize ease of access. . . . 
They work with donors and originating agencies to ensure that any restrictions are appropriate, well-
documented, and equitably enforced. When repositories require restrictions to protect confidential 
and proprietary information, such restrictions should be implemented in an impartial manner. In 
all questions of access, archivists seek practical solutions that balance competing principles and 
interests. 
Id.
As to privacy, the Society recognizes its importance but places an emphasis on the privacy of 
those who had no say in the collection’s disposition rather than the donor’s privacy: 
Archivists recognize that privacy is sanctioned by law. They establish procedures and policies to 
protect the interests of the donors, individuals, groups, and institutions whose public and private 
lives and activities are recorded in their holdings. As appropriate, archivists place access restric-
tions on collections to ensure that privacy and confidentiality are maintained, particularly for 
individuals and groups who have no voice or role in collections’ creation, retention, or public use.
Id. 
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¶25 By and large, the public agrees with archivists about access to nonpersonal 
government information. In 1989, Elena S. Danielson, an archivist at the Hoover 
Institute, wrote of the increasing demands for both open and equitable access to 
archival materials, saying “public opinion is solidly on the side of the principle of 
open and equal access, at least in the United States.”29 This has become only more 
accurate as we have grown accustomed to ready digital access to extensive amounts 
of information through the Internet.
¶26 Danielson raises another problem resulting from the private property 
model and the Justices’ idiosyncratic approach to access—that of equitable access. 
It is not at all uncommon for a Supreme Court Justice to handpick a biographer and 
give that person exclusive access to the papers that are closed to everyone else. 
Again, this forces librarians and archivists into a position that contradicts the very 
essence of their professions. As Sara Hodson explains in her work on curating the 
papers of authors and celebrities, 
curators and archivists should not acquire, except in extremely unusual circumstances, any 
papers that carry with them decrees of selective access in which the donor or other desig-
nated individual retains the right to decide, on a case-by-case basis, and according to his 
or her own criteria, who will be able to see the collection. Donors may wish to limit access 
in order to reserve an archive for the exclusive use of an authorized biographer, or of those 
who have demonstrated the proper reverence or respect for the papers’ creator, or they may 
simply wish to wield power over the papers and over applicants for the donors’ favor. Such 
selective availability . . . contravenes the ethic of free and unfettered access that remains a cor-
nerstone of the archival profession in a democratic society. . . .30
The Public’s Interest in Accessing Justices’ Papers
Nature and Power of the Court
¶27 The conflict between our professional ethic of access and the Justices’ desire 
to remain secretive regarding the work of the Court prompts the question: how 
significant is the public’s interest in access to the Justices’ working papers? If we as 
librarians and archivists are seeking a balance between access and privacy, how 
much weight lies on the access side of the scale? 
¶28 The current mission statement of the National Archives and Records 
Administration states that “[p]ublic access to government records strengthens 
democracy by allowing Americans to claim their rights of citizenship, hold their 
government accountable, and understand their history so they can participate more 
effectively in their government.”31 Similarly, Steven Aftergood notes that without 
disclosure of government information, “citizens are deprived of a meaningful role 
in the political process, and the exercise of authority is insulated from public over-
sight and control.”32 Is it enough that we have access to the briefs, the transcripts 
 29. Elena S. Danielson, The Ethics of Access, 52 Am. Archivist 52, 59 (1989).
 30. Sara S. Hodson, In Secret Kept, In Silence Sealed: Privacy in the Papers of Authors and Celebri-
ties, 67 Am. Archivist 194, 198 (2004) (emphasis added); see also Timothy D. Pyatt, Southern Family 
Honor Tarnished? Issues of Privacy in the Walker Percy and Shelby Foote Papers, in Privacy and Con-
fidentiality Perspectives 141, 151 (Menzi L. Behrnd-Klodt & Peter J. Wosh eds., 2005).
 31. Vision and Mission, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., https://www.archives.gov/about/info 
/mission.html [https://perma.cc/JZK4-BL8S].
 32. Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 
399, 399 (2009). Although this article addresses the classification system for government information, 
Aftergood’s point is valid in other contexts as well. 
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and (more recently) recordings of the arguments before the Court, and the Court’s 
opinions? To have a “meaningful role” and “public oversight and control” over the 
“exercise of authority,” do we need access to the papers the Supreme Court Justices 
generate in their cogitations and negotiations?
¶29 In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court ascended as the arbiter of our 
nation’s most difficult questions, be they cultural, moral, or constitutional.33 Con-
gress is characterized more by gridlock than anything else, and our presidents are 
engaged in wars, elections, and crisis management. As a result, “all sides now iden-
tify the Supreme Court as the key to American politics and policy-making.”34 
¶30 In its ascendancy, the Supreme Court has also become more politicized. 
The nomination process has become bitter, and the Justices have become less 
consensus-oriented. Five-to-four decisions and vituperative dissents, predictably 
along partisan lines, are frequent occurrences now. Empirical research shows that 
the Justices’ decision making is both strategic and ideological. The work done by 
Lee Epstein and Jack Knight shows that the Justices bargain with one another for 
votes,35 adjust language to placate each other,36 and accommodate to ensure the 
continued legitimacy of the Court.37 Another study by Epstein, along with Landes 
and Posner, concludes that data from Supreme Court decisions show “strong evi-
dence that ideology does influence the Justices’ judicial votes, and thus the Court’s 
outcomes, in a variety of cases, and that this ideological influence has been 
growing.”38 In other words, despite protestations made to the contrary by nomi-
nees during their Senate hearings, Supreme Court Justices are more realist than 
 33. See William J. Quirk, Courts & Congress (2008). Quirk argues that Congress is responsible 
for the Supreme Court’s ascendancy. Members of Congress are particularly vulnerable to the bal-
lot, so, says Quirk, they have passed off the most difficult governance decisions to the judicial and 
executive branches. This allows members of Congress to avoid tough decisions that might not sit 
well with voters. Thus the president has taken on the responsibility for all wars since World War II, 
and the Supreme Court has taken on the responsibility for the most challenging moral, cultural, and 
constitutional decisions. He labels this the Happy Convention, distinguishing the arrangement from 
the balance of power and decision making envisaged in the Constitution. Id. Jeffrey Rosen sees much 
the same result but asserts that the Supreme Court made the first move to expand its influence rather 
than responding to congressional off-loading of difficult decisions. Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Demo-
cratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America 10 (2006) (“In the twentieth century, however, the 
courts became increasingly aggressive about asserting their own exclusive authority to interpret the 
Constitution, embracing a defiant form of judicial supremacy. In response, the other branches of 
government became, not surprisingly, more passive.”).
 34. Quirk, supra note 33, at 5. 
 35. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Choices Justices Make 58–79 (1998).
 36. Id. at 74–75.
 37. Id. at 46–49. Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman reach a conclusion similar to that of Epstein 
and Knight. The willingness of Supreme Court Justices to accommodate their colleagues when writ-
ing an opinion 
is influenced strongly by strategic concerns—including the size of the majority conference coali-
tion, the ideological distance of the author from the majority coalition, the ideological heterogene-
ity of the conference majority coalition, and the positions taken by majority coalition members 
and by nonstrategic factors including the author’s workload and the complexity of a case.
Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs & Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accom-
modation on the United States Supreme Court, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 294, 294 (1998). 
 38. Lee Epstein et al., The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study 
of Rational Science 103 (2013).
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legalist.39 These empirical studies are corroborated by extensive qualitative and 
anecdotal work.40 
¶31 As Quirk puts it, this arrangement of power “‘works all very neatly’ except 
for the American people who know little about the nine individuals ‘with enormous 
power over their lives.’”41 The Supreme Court “will powerfully shape, and will often 
chart, the course of our lives as individuals, as communities, and as a nation.”42 Its 
decisions affect our births, our educations, our livelihoods, our intimacies, our 
families, our illnesses, and our deaths. And, as Laurence Tribe points out, the 
Supreme Court does more than just play a role—it chooses the script, casts the 
parts, and directs the show.43 
¶32 Although it wields remarkable influence on our society, the Supreme Court 
has shielded itself from the scrutiny to which the other branches of government are 
subject, keeping the American people at arm’s length. Despite the fact that their 
published opinions include lengthy explanations, the Court’s work is shrouded in a 
veil of secrecy.44 Those who work for the Court are under strict orders to keep their 
work confidential.45 The press has virtually no view behind the curtain. Cameras 
are not allowed in the courtroom, and for a reporter to get beyond press releases is 
“nearly impossible.”46 In addition, many former Supreme Court clerks now hold 
 39. Legalism, or formalism, is the theory that judges make decisions solely by applying the law 
to facts. Realism, on the other hand, recognizes that judges, like everyone else, have individual senses 
of justice, ingrained ideologies, class, race, and gender identifications, religious upbringings, job-
related concerns, and other “incentives and constraints.” Id. at 3. Epstein, Landes, and Posner do not 
hold with an extreme view of legal realism in which every decision is political in nature but rather 
embrace a more nuanced realism that “attempt[s] to be realistic about judicial behavior.” Id. See also 
generally Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The 
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (1993); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? 
An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (2006); Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic 
Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 341 (2010); Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, 
The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1671 (2016); Jeffrey R. Lax & 
Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 276 (2007); William P. Marshall, Judicial Takings, Judicial Speech, and Doctrinal Acceptance of the 
Model of the Judge as Political Actor, 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2011).
 40. See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Supreme Myths: Why the Supreme Court Is Not a Court and 
Its Justices Are Not Judges (2012). Segall unabashedly asserts that the Justices’ decision making is 
not based in legalism but rather on value judgments. He goes so far as to characterize the Supreme 
Court as a “political veto council.” He bases his conclusions on a close scrutiny of decisions that turns 
up inconsistencies and incoherencies that cannot be explained by anything other than short-term 
strategy and accommodation. See also Epstein & Knight, supra note 35; Epstein et al., supra note 38; 
Linda Greenhouse, The U.S. Supreme Court: A Very Short Introduction (2012); Edward Lazarus, 
Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the Modern Supreme Court (2005); Forrest 
Maltzman et al., Crafting the Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (2000); David M. 
O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics (10th ed. 2014); Roosevelt, supra 
note 1; Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Supreme Court (2008); Jeffrey Toobin, The Oath: The 
Obama White House and the Supreme Court (2013); Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The 
Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (1979). 
 41. Quirk, supra note 33, at 20. 
 42. Laurence H. Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court 139 (1984). 
 43. Id. (“In fact, even the term ‘role’ is misleading: it suggests that the Supreme Court is but one 
actor on the legal and political stage. . . . But if we have learned one thing from the history of our Court 
in the life of our country, it is that the Justices are not just so many actors on the stage. To them has 
fallen a large share of a far more basic function—that of playwright and director.”).
 44. See generally Covering the Supreme Court in the Digital Age (Richard Davis ed., 2014). 
 45. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 40; Toobin, supra note 40. 
 46. Quirk, supra note 33, at 20.
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influential positions in the legal profession, and most have little desire to lift the 
veil.47 
¶33 The Court’s inscrutability is enhanced by the lifetime tenure of the Justices. 
With no accountability to the electorate, the Justices’ decisions are reviewable only 
by Congress, and then only when the decision interprets a federal statute and when 
Congress can muster the will to respond. Sometimes, Congress does review and 
respond to Supreme Court decisions, as it did when it passed the Americans with 
Disabilities Amendments Acts of 2008.48 In this act, Congress broadened applica-
tion of the term “disability,” which had been severely narrowed over time by the 
Supreme Court.49 Such instances of direct response to the Court are rare.50 
¶34 The distance between the Supreme Court and the public does enhance the 
dignity of the Court, as mystery always does, while familiarity breeds contempt. 
But the Justices’ ability to shield their working papers for decades after they leave 
the Court takes the inscrutability well beyond preserving the dignity of the Court. 
Instead, it deprives people of knowledge about the governmental body that charts 
our society’s cultural and moral decision making. In short, we have no guaranteed 
access to the materials that would enlighten us as to how the Court reaches its deci-
sions. Hidden from us are the answers to such questions as: what institutional or 
strategic concerns influenced the decision and the language in which it was 
couched? What personal views were accommodated or sidestepped? What doubts 
were voiced? What voices silenced? Answers to these questions are important if we 
are to play a meaningful role in the political process. If nothing else, they can 
inform future nominations and approvals. Yet whether we ever have access to this 
information is a decision that rests in the hands of the very men and women who 
generate the information, and they are reluctant to share. 
Differential Treatment
¶35 It is also problematic that the Justices’ papers are treated differently from 
executive branch papers. With the implementation of the Freedom of Information 
Act in 1967, federal agencies had to retain records and make them available to the 
public upon request.51 Then, following the Watergate scandal, Congress passed the 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974,52 which required 
the White House to turn over all materials related to President Nixon’s abuse of 
 47. Id.; see also David Margolick, Meet the Supremes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2007, at 71 (“[Former 
clerks] can be very full of themselves, priggish and protective, even proprietary, about the court. Just 
ask Edward Lazarus, who in 1998 published an account of his year clerking for Justice Blackmun; for 
his breach of omertà, his fellow clerks shunned him at Blackmun’s funeral.”).
 48. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
 49. Id. § 2 (specifically rejecting the Supreme Court’s application of the definition of “disability”).
 50. This does not include congressional or state efforts to achieve Supreme Court approval for 
laws that skirt the edge of constitutional validity. New legislation responding to a Supreme Court 
decision that a gun control law or abortion law is too restrictive is relatively frequent, but in these 
situations there is no real “review” of the Supreme Court decision because constitutional determina-
tions cannot be altered by any body except the Supreme Court itself.
 51. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 350 (1966). The Freedom of Information Act built on the 
groundwork established by the Federal Records Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-754, 64 Stat. 578, 583. The 
Federal Records Act required federal agencies to maintain records and cooperate with the National 
Archives and Records Administration, which had been established in 1934, for long-term preserva-
tion and disposition. 
 52. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
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power to the National Archives for retention, processing, and public access. In 
1978, upon recommendation of the National Study Commission on Records and 
Documents of Federal Officials,53 Congress passed the Presidential Records Act 
(PRA), which expanded preservation requirements to all presidents and vice presi-
dents beginning January 20, 1981.54 This act changed the ownership of presidential 
records55 from private to public. 
¶36 Although it passed the PRA, Congress ignored the commission’s recommen-
dation as to judicial papers. The commission had been tasked with studying the pri-
vate ownership of presidential papers as well as those of all other elected and appointed 
federal officials, including judges. In its final report, issued in 1977, the commission 
recommended that judicial papers—those falling into a category the commission 
labeled “public papers”—be considered public rather than private property. According 
to the commission’s report, these “public papers” would fall between “Federal 
records”56 and “personal papers.” The commission asserted that “public papers” 
should include those that were “produced by elected or appointed officials in their 
official capacity, were clearly clothed with a public interest, and were often the only 
source of the information upon which to form judgments necessary to the democratic 
process.”57 “Public papers” would include materials such as “confidential communica-
tions between an official and his staff; working papers reflecting the decision-making 
process; conference notes; and various other materials . . . .”58 This is essentially what 
Congress did with records of the presidents and vice presidents in the PRA. 
¶37 Alongside this category of “public papers,” the commission urged a defini-
tion of “personal papers” as those 
of a purely private or non-official character and which were neither created nor received 
in connection with the conduct of constitutional or statutory duties. Personal papers might 
include diaries, family records, and correspondence not involving official duties.59
 53. This study commission was simply known as the Public Documents Commission. 
 54. Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (1978).
 55. “Presidential records” are defined as
documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, created or received by the 
President, the President’s immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the 
President whose function is to advise or assist the President, in the course of conducting activities 
which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other 
official or ceremonial duties of the President. Such term (A) includes any documentary materials 
relating to the political activities of the President or members of the President’s staff, but only if 
such activities relate to or have a direct effect upon the carrying out of constitutional, statutory, or 
other official or ceremonial duties of the President . . . .
44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (Supp. I 2014).
 56. “Federal records” was and still is defined statutorily to include all materials
regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by [a Federal agency] under 
Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate 
for preservation by that agency . . . as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, 
procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value 
of data in them. 
44 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. I 2014). The 1968 law used the phrasing “an agency of the United States Gov-
ernment” rather than “a Federal agency.” This is notable since the term “Federal agency” has excluded 
the Supreme Court since 1984. See infra note 61. This appears to have been changed in 2014 by the 
Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-187, 128 Stat. 2003. The 
2014 amendments also clarified that digital or electronic records were included. 
 57. See Commission Final Report, supra note 21, at 6. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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In reaching these recommendations, the commission did an admirable job of 
hearing testimony from many different constituencies, including archivists and 
historians, and weighing the public’s need for information in a democracy against 
negative effects on judges and Justices. Congress, however, did nothing with these 
recommendations.60 Then in 1984, Congress took the unexplained step of 
specifically excepting the Supreme Court from the definition of “Federal agency” 
in the Federal Records Act.61 As a result, the Supreme Court is not required to 
deposit its official materials in the National Archives. Nothing in the legislative 
history of this 1984 amendment specifically addresses this change, though the 
commission’s final report from 1977 stated that the Archivist of the United States 
had always acted on the assumption that the Supreme Court did not fall within the 
scope of the statutory definition of “federal agency.”62 The exception added in 1984 
originated in the Senate and was agreed to in conference. As it happens, the 
Supreme Court has authorized the deposit of many of its records (which do not 
include the Justices’ papers) with the National Archives, which now holds records 
through 1997.63 Those since 1997 remain at the Supreme Court Library.64 
¶38 It is worth noting that when Congress passed the PRA, it also ignored the 
commission’s recommendations as to its own members’ papers. Arguably, then, the 
 60. All the bills introduced in 1974, 1975, 1977, and 1978 that culminated in the Presidential 
Records Act dealt only with the records of the executive branch, particularly the president and vice 
president. Indeed, it was asserted by Philip W. Buchen, former counsel to the president, in a hearing 
in front of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, that presidential 
papers would be of more interest and usefulness than the papers of legislators or judges and Justices 
and would offer, to put it in colloquial terms, the most bang for the buck. He went on to say, however, 
that Congress should also do to itself what it wanted to do to the executive. Hearings on H.R. 10998 
and Related Bills to Amend the Freedom of Information Act to Insure Public Access to the Official Papers 
of the President, and for Other Purposes, Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations 
House of Representatives, 95th Cong. 29, 32 (1978) (statement of Philip W. Buchen, former Counsel 
to the President).
 61. Pub. L. No. 98-497, 98 Stat. 2280 (1984). Prior to this law, the definition of “Federal agency” 
included “any executive agency or any establishment in the legislative or judicial branch of the 
Government (except the Senate, House of Representatives, and the Architect of the Capitol and 
any activities under his direction).” In 1984, Congress changed this definition to “the term ‘Federal 
agency’ means any executive agency or any establishment in the legislative or judicial branch of the 
Government (except the Supreme Court, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Architect 
of the Capitol and any activities under the direction of the Architect of the Capitol).” 
 62. Commission Final Report, supra note 21, at 25. 
 63. Guide to Federal Records: Records of the Supreme Court of the United States, Nat’l Archives 
& Records Admin., https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/267.html [https://
perma.cc/4N2V-R93Y]. 
 64. The Supreme Court discussed the common law right of access to judicial records in Nixon v. 
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). The Supreme Court wrestled with the issue of privacy 
versus public access regarding tape recordings that had been submitted as evidence—and played in 
court—during trials following Watergate. The Court recognized a common law right of access to 
judicial records and noted that, although infrequently litigated, past court decisions had found that 
a desire to “keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies” and “publish information con-
cerning the operation of government” were adequate interests to support exercise of the right. Id. at 
598. The Court declined, however, to decide Nixon’s dispute with Warner Communications on this 
common law basis. The Presidential Recordings and Materials Act, which provided for the eventual 
release of the tapes and similar materials created by President Nixon, had recently been passed by 
Congress. This, the Court said, would take care of the dispute in due time. Plus, by deferring to the 
process established by the legislature, the Court avoided frustrating “the achievement of any legisla-
tive goals of orderly processing and protection of the rights of all affected persons.” Id. at 606.
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judicial and legislative branches are treated alike. However, as Watts points out in 
her work on this subject, the activities of the legislative branch are subject to far 
more scrutiny than the judicial branch. Television cameras roll on the House and 
Senate floors twenty-four hours a day. Debate is recorded for posterity. Committees 
hold public hearings, publish transcripts, and issue reports.65 And, in the end, 
members of Congress can be voted out of office. The Supreme Court is subject to 
none of this scrutiny or accountability. All we can do is scour the Justices’ opinions; 
the rest is speculation. 
Effect of Access to Justices’ Papers on Scholarship and Knowledge
¶39 What happens when we do have access to the Justices’ papers? Journalist 
and legal scholar Stephen Wermiel asserts that the use of Justices’ papers to craft 
insights into the Court’s decisions and inner workings began in the 1950s. Alpheus 
T. Mason published Justice Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law in 1956.66 Alexan-
der M. Bickel’s The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan: The Supreme 
Court at Work quickly followed in 1957.67 According to Wermiel, the paradigm 
shift was complete by the end of the 1970s with the publication of Richard Kluger’s 
Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s 
Struggle for Equality,68 which made use of the notes of Justices Harold Burton, Felix 
Frankfurter, and others; and Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong’s The Brethren: 
Inside the Supreme Court,69 which also relied heavily on available papers.70 These 
popular books were read by more people than just legal scholars and had a consid-
erable effect on the nation’s knowledge of and interest in the Supreme Court. 
¶40 Further investigation provides other evidence that Supreme Court and con-
stitutional law scholarship is both shaped and enhanced by the availability of Jus-
tices’ papers. This research has shed light on the politico-strategic nature of the 
Justices’ decision making and the (sometimes less influential than expected) role of 
ideology. Consider the following examples. 
 65. Unfortunately, the openness of congressional activities is not ensured. In the summer of 2017, 
a select group of Republicans held closed-door meetings to draft a healthcare law that was intended 
to “repeal and replace” the Affordable Care Act. Neither their colleagues nor the public was pleased, 
and in the end, the legislation was defeated. It is also a frustration to researchers that documents 
such as Congressional Research Service reports and even committee reports do not have to be made 
available to the public. See, e.g., Laura Litvan, GOP Health Bill Kept Secret from Senators Assigned 
to Write It, Bloomberg Politics, June 20, 2017, 4:04 PM EDT, https://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2017-06-20/senate-republicans-haven-t-seen-their-secret-health-bill-either. 
 66. Alpheus T. Mason, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (1956).
 67. Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan: The Supreme 
Court at Work (1957).
 68. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black 
America’s Struggle for Equality (1975).
 69. Woodward & Armstrong, supra note 40. The Anthony Lewis papers at the Library of Con-
gress contain materials that raise questions about some of the assertions in The Brethren. For more 
on the Anthony Lewis papers, see Anthony Lewis Papers, 1941–1975, Libr. of Cong., https://www.loc 
.gov/item/mm81075856/ [https://perma.cc/X4R2-C3RU]. This is only further evidence of the impor-
tance of access to collections, so that the truth about our Supreme Court can be known. 
 70. Wermiel, supra note 6. Wermiel asserts that these publications prompted the Justices to 
respond with increasingly protective restrictions on their papers. Id. at 502–04. According to Justice 
Hugo Black’s son, this was when his father decided that he wanted his own papers to be destroyed. Id. 
at 501 (citing Hugo Black, Jr., My Father: A Remembrance 250–51 (1975)). Yet Brandeis’s restric-
tions on his papers occurred in the 1930s, and Frankfurter’s purported trip to Louisville to reclaim his 
papers from Brandeis’s archive occurred in 1941. 
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¶41 In The Choices Justices Make, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight explicitly state 
their reliance on the Justices’ papers: 
[O]ur focus on the Burger Court era is by no means accidental. We needed to collect most 
of the data from the Justices’ papers rather than from published sources. For the Burger 
Court years, we could access (1) the case files of Marshall and Brennan, who served dur-
ing the entire period; (2) Justice Powell’s records, including case files, dockets books, and 
conference notes, dating from January 1972; and (3) Brennan’s conference notes and docket 
books—records that scholars have deemed highly reliable and comprehensive. . . . These 
data constitute our primary samples.71
¶42 Forrest Maltzman, James Spriggs, and Paul Wahlbeck similarly depend on 
the Justices’ papers in exploring the strategic nature of the Justices’ decision mak-
ing.72 For example, in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, Justice Brennan wrote a majority 
opinion regarding Miranda warnings that broke rather dramatically from his usual 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Maltzman and his coauthors ask, 
Why did Brennan author an opinion that restricted individual liberties? And why did 
Marshall refuse to join his ideological ally, while Brennan’s usual adversaries chose to join 
his opinion? The answers become clear when we delve into the personal papers of the 
justices. In a letter to Marshall dated June 7, 1990, Justice Brennan informed Marshall that 
although “everyone except you and me would recognize the existence of an exception to 
Miranda for ‘routine booking questions,’ . . . I made the strategic judgment to concede the 
existence of an exception but to use my control over the opinion to define the exception as 
narrowly as possible.”73
¶43 In Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the Modern Supreme 
Court, former Blackmun clerk Edward Lazarus acknowledges that the papers of 
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan, Douglas, and Jackson contributed to his 
research.74 In the preface to the tenth edition of The Supreme Court in American 
Politics, David O’Brien notes that this edition “includes new material from recently 
released papers of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Potter Stewart and Byron 
White.”75 Earlier editions also used the papers of Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and 
Powell as those collections were already open to public access76—all in addition to 
the papers of sixty-three Justices consulted for the first edition.77  
¶44 In 2001, Del Dickson published The Supreme Court in Conference, a one-
of-a-kind compilation of conference notes drawn from collections available at the 
time.78 Dickson mentions that permission was needed to use the conference notes 
of Justices Douglas, Brennan, Jackson, and Black, which he was granted. He also 
gives “special credit” to Justices Burton, Frankfurter, and Warren for placing “all or 
part of their collection in the public domain. . . .” More than 120 law review articles 
 71. Epstein & Knight, supra note 35, at xv. 
 72. Maltzman et al., supra note 40, at 3. 
 73. Id. (citation omitted); see also Wahlbeck et al., supra note 37, at 314 (noting the authors’ use 
of memos found in the papers of Justices Brennan and Marshall; these memos were written by Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and White). 
 74. Lazarus, supra note 40, at viii.
 75. O’Brien, supra note 40, at xiv. 
 76. Id.
 77. Id. at xvii. 
 78. The Supreme Court in Conference (1940–1985): The Private Discussions Behind Nearly 
300 Supreme Court Decisions (Del Dickson ed., 2001). 
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have used and cited Dickson’s work since its publication.79 As it is unlikely that 120 
authors would have received the permissions granted to Dickson, our scholarship 
would have been diminished were it not for Dickson’s work. This is a striking 
example of the richness added to legal scholarship when the Justices’ papers are 
made available and the unmeasurable loss to scholarship that results from 
restrictions.  
¶45 Not surprisingly, biographers also rely on the Justices’ papers. Author How-
ard Ball acknowledged the help of librarians in accessing manuscript collections for 
his biography of Hugo Black, and the notes include citations to ten collections of 
the Justice’s papers.80 Gerald T. Dunne’s book on Justice Black likewise cites to the 
papers of both Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter.81 Stephen Wermiel had access 
to Justice Brennan’s papers while writing Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion.82 Wer-
miel and coauthor Seth Stern also cite to the papers of Hugo Black, Harry Black-
mun, Tom Clark, William Douglas, Abe Fortas, Felix Frankfurter, Arthur Goldberg, 
John Marshall Harlan, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis Powell, and Earl Warren.83 
¶46 Other biographers have spoken about the lack of access to some Justices’ 
papers. In his recent work on Chief Justice Earl Warren, Paul Moke questions the 
reliability of some of what has been written about Warren, as published portrayals 
of his life may have been scripted for political reasons given his earlier role as a 
political figure. Moke notes that the problem is compounded by the fact that War-
ren burned all his correspondence with his colleagues on the Court.84 In a similar 
vein, Michael J. Graetz and Linda Greenhouse express particular gratitude to the 
Justices who have made their papers available, adding to the depth of their 2016 
book, The Burger Court and the Rise of the Judicial Right. Graetz and Greenhouse 
note, without further comment, that Burger’s own papers remain unavailable until 
2026.85 
¶47 Archivists’ ethical stance against unequal access to papers was discussed 
above.86 The Justices’ habit of creating unequal access by anointing a biographer 
and giving him or her exclusive access to the working papers can have a consider-
able effect on scholarship. One effect is delay. For example, Wermiel was granted 
exclusive access to Justice Brennan’s papers but took twenty-five years to publish his 
work.87 Meanwhile, the public waited.  
¶48 In addition to delay, errors can go uncorrected or the record can be left 
incomplete. Consider the example of Bennett Boskey, who clerked for Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone and Justice Stanley Reed in the early 1940s. When he left his last 
clerkship, Boskey took nine volumes of memos with him—memos he and his co-
clerks had written. Because papers produced in the Justices’ chambers are consid-
ered personal rather than government property, Boskey was free to do so, and the 
 79. Results of a search in Westlaw’s database of law reviews and journals for the following: adv: 
“del dickson” w/15 “supreme court in conference.”
 80. Howard Ball, Hugo L. Black: Cold Steel Warrior 253–88 (1996).
 81. Gerald T. Dunne, Hugo Black and the Judicial Revolution 470–72 (1977).
 82. Seth Stern & Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 550 (2010).
 83. Id. at 557. 
 84. Paul Moke, Earl Warren and the Struggle for Justice 14–15 (2015). 
 85. Michael J. Graetz & Linda Greenhouse, The Burger Court and the Rise of the Judicial 
Right 10 (2016). 
 86. See supra ¶¶ 5–26.
 87. Jeffrey Toobin, A Not So Brief Recess, New Yorker, Jan. 5, 2004, at 28. 
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Justices gladly approved of his interest. After Stone’s death, a biographer was given 
exclusive access to the Chief Justice’s papers. Boskey became disenchanted with the 
biographer and kept his memos to himself. The memos, which are of scholarly 
interest, did not come to light until 2015.88 
Privacy Interests
The Justices’ Privacy Interests
¶49 In light of all this weight on the side of access, what weighs on the side of 
privacy? In a 1960 article, William Prosser identified the four privacy interests 
protected by common law. These were later incorporated into the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. They are the interests in being free from
•	 intrusion upon seclusion or intrusion into private affairs;
•	 public disclosure of embarrassing private facts;
•	 publicity that places the person in a false light; and 
•	 appropriation of one’s name or likeness for another’s advantage.89
¶50 The first three categories require consideration. As for Prosser’s fourth 
category, a Justice’s name or likeness could be appropriated by someone for that 
person’s advantage, but this harm would not arise from access to the Justice’s 
papers. 
¶51 The interest in protection from public disclosure of embarrassing facts 
necessitates that the facts be private. “Private” generally implies that the facts are 
related to one’s personal life—health, sexual activities, and family life. The papers 
of the Justices are work produced in the course of government employment, not 
material related to their private lives. “Private facts” would not be present. The 
private facts must also be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, 
a circumstance unlikely to occur in the Justices’ working papers, the Rehnquist 
memo discussed below90 notwithstanding. 
¶52 The offensiveness to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is also 
required when the interest is protection from publicity that places a person in a 
false light. In addition, with this latter interest, the publicity must involve falseness 
or invention,91 which would actually be more difficult for someone with nefarious 
intent to achieve if there were more access to the Justices’ papers rather than less, 
since there would be more opportunity for others to counter the “invention.”
¶53 It is Prosser’s first category, the intrusion into private affairs, that may strike 
the closest at what the Justices feel they might suffer: unwanted scrutiny into com-
munications and contemplations that were intended to be safe for open dialogue 
and experimental thinking. This concern is a sympathetic one. No one appreciates 
it when conversations that occur behind closed doors are made public. The prob-
lem with fitting this concern into Prosser’s category is, once again, that the private 
 88. See Ross E. Davies, Some Clerical Contributions to Ex parte Quirin, 19 Green Bag 2d 283 
(2016). Davies was given the memos by Boskey. 
 89. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
ch. 28A (Am. Law Inst. 1977). 
 90. See infra ¶¶ 66–70. 
 91. Prosser, supra note 89, at 400. 
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affairs contemplated by tort law relate to personal lives, not work done in govern-
mental service. 
¶54 This uneasiness is exacerbated by the doctrine that “there is no liability 
when [public figures] are given additional publicity, as to matters reasonably within 
the scope of the public interest which they have aroused.”92 Prosser states that a 
public figure “has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, 
mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legiti-
mate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a ‘public 
personage.’”93 This certainly sounds like today’s Supreme Court Justices. 
¶55 So far, the customary privacy interests and possible violations do not easily 
fit the Justices’ papers. Prosser’s four privacy interests reflect only the common law 
of torts and are limited by the time in which he wrote. Since Prosser’s time, consti-
tutional and statutory privacy protections have expanded significantly. In addition, 
our ability to collect, manipulate, aggregate, store, and share digital information has 
changed the privacy landscape dramatically. Many scholars have expanded the dis-
cussion of the nature of privacy, the legal right to privacy, and harms resulting from 
invasions of privacy beyond Prosser’s four interests. This article is not the forum for 
a thorough look at this discussion, but two recent contributions help frame the 
privacy interests the Justices might have in their working papers. 
¶56 In A Taxonomy of Privacy,94 Daniel Solove develops a schema of sixteen 
privacy harms arising from four activities. These four activities are information 
collecting, information processing, information dissemination, and invasion.95 Of 
these, the activity of information dissemination gives rise to those harms most rel-
evant to the Justices’ papers. These harms include breach of confidentiality, disclo-
sure, and increased accessibility, all of which are related to Prosser’s tort of intrusion 
into private affairs.96 Breach of confidentiality and disclosure are two sides of the 
same coin—true information being revealed. Breach of confidentiality speaks to the 
harm done to a relationship of trust while disclosure regards the harm done to 
reputation. No doubt the Justices are worried about their reputations through dis-
closure, but it may well be harm to the relationships with the other Justices and with 
their clerks that is the greater concern. Given the responsibility of their positions, 
the difficulty of the work they do, and the fact that they often work together for 
decades, trust must be a key element in the functioning of the Supreme Court. This 
is reflected in the decisions made by several Justices to delay the opening of their 
papers until after the retirements or deaths of their colleagues on the bench. 
¶57 Solove’s harm of increased accessibility occurs when information that was 
available but obscured by difficulty of access is suddenly much easier to find due to 
digitization.97 This issue has been a significant concern in the digitization of court 
filings, which used to require a weary trip to the courthouse for access.98 This article 
 92. Id. at 412 (citation omitted).
 93. Id. at 410.
 94. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (2006).
 95. Id. at 489.
 96. Id. at 526–29.
 97. Id. at 539–40.
 98. See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical Study, 30 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1807 (2015). For a case study on University of North Carolina Law Library’s experi-
ence with digitizing court records, see Nicole M. Downing, The UNC Law Library’s Redaction of its 
Digitized Collection of North Carolina Supreme Court Briefs: A Case Study (May 2014) (unpublished 
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does not tackle questions of digitizing Justices’ papers; it advocates for earlier (or 
later in rare cases), more predictable, and more equitable access. The changes in 
practice being advocated here would not cause the profound leap in accessibility 
that digitizing does. If these changes were adopted, it is largely the timing that 
would change, not the ease of use. 
¶58 Aside from identifying these three possible harms, Solove’s taxonomy sheds 
little light on questions surrounding the Justices’ privacy interests. Solove focuses 
more on the collection of information about individuals through surveillance, 
online tracking, and electronic aggregation, along with the use and misuse of that 
data. Koops and colleagues take a different approach in A Typology of Privacy,99 
delineating types of privacy rather than harms and searching for “ideal” renditions 
of these types using legal sources from multiple countries. The authors create an 
array of eight types of privacy that range along two axes: one axis that indicates the 
zone in which the information occurs, moving from a personal zone to the public 
zone, and one axis that represents the shift from a positive concept of privacy (free-
dom to . . .) to a negative concept of privacy (freedom from . . .). 100 An additional 
layer that touches all eight underlying types of privacy is “informational privacy.” 
From this typology, intellectual privacy and decisional privacy are the two types 
that best fit what we can discern of the Justices’ interests.101 
¶59 The intellectual privacy type, derived in part from the protection of docu-
ments afforded by the Fourth Amendment, protects against scrutiny of one’s 
thoughts. Other constitutional values are also reflected in intellectual privacy. For 
example, intellectual privacy facilitates both freedom of expression and freedom of 
association. Obviously, the papers of the Justices contain expressions of their own 
thinking and communications with others about ideas. That is what makes them 
valuable to researchers. The problem is that the concern in Koops’ intellectual pri-
vacy is keeping the government out of peoples’ private lives. With the Justices’ 
papers, it is the people who want to see into the veiled life of the government.   
¶60 This same issue arises with Koops’ decisional privacy. Although the term 
“decisional” sounds appropriate to materials created by the Justices, the decisions 
they are making are not the kinds of personal decisions protected by this decisional 
privacy. Decisional privacy protects decisions such as those surrounding “sex, 
sexuality, and child rearing.”102 Medical, religious, and to a certain degree educa-
tional decisions are also largely protected. All of these are protected because they 
are personal or family decisions, and it is inappropriate for the government to 
interfere. It does not follow that the decision-making processes of government 
employees should be protected from the public eye, especially when the public has 
no power to interfere with those decisions. 
M.S.L.S. thesis, University of North Carolina), https://works.bepress.com/aallcallforpapers/84/down 
load/ [https://perma.cc/6JX7-X6AW].   
 99. Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 483 (2017).
 100. Id. at 566. The four positive types of privacy are, moving from a private zone to a 
public zone, intellectual privacy, decisional privacy, associational privacy, and behavioral privacy. 
The four negative privacies, again moving from private to public, are bodily privacy, spatial privacy, 
communicational privacy, and proprietary privacy. 
 101. Koops et al. also discuss a communicational privacy, which sounds promising but 
focuses more on government interference with telecommunications, documents sent via mail, and 
personal conversations. Id. at 523–26.
 102. Id. at 533.
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¶61 It is also possible to link the Justices’ papers with Koops’ proprietary privacy 
type, which is “a person’s interest in using property as a means to shield activity, 
facts, things, or information from the view of others.”103 The Justices do employ the 
private ownership of their papers to shield information, but to conclude that 
because they can do so means they have a protection-worthy interest in doing so 
would require circular reasoning. 
¶62 The Justices have given little explanation of what they see as their privacy 
interest. When writing to the Librarian of Congress in the wake of the Marshall 
papers’ release, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that a majority of the Justices 
were “surprised and disappointed” in the unexpectedly early release “[g]iven the 
Court’s long tradition of confidentiality in its deliberations.”104 This confidentiality 
and the trust relationship it supports, which mirror the breach of confidentiality 
harm seen in the discussion of Solove’s taxonomy above, seem to best articulate 
what the Justices want to protect. 
¶63 The desire to protect the confidentiality of conference and chamber is intui-
tively understandable, at least to a degree. The Justices need to be able to consider 
all angles of a decision, weigh different outcomes, and experiment with logic and 
language—and they want to be free from fear of embarrassment or misunderstand-
ing while doing so.105 Arguably, the tradition of confidentiality results in more 
thoughtful and balanced decisions, to the benefit of our society. Without protec-
tion, the argument goes, communications and contemplations within the Supreme 
Court would be chilled. 
¶64 Thus far, however, there has been no real indication that access to a Justice’s 
papers results in a harmful chilling effect. The Justices expressed dismay when the 
Marshall papers were opened just two years after his retirement, yet the papers 
revealed nothing shocking or scandalous. Instead, they indicated that the Supreme 
Court Justices share ideas, disagree, adjust their thinking, and wrangle over word 
choice—activities one would expect of a deliberative judicial body and matters of 
interest to serious scholars rather than scandalmongers. Then, when Justice Black-
mun’s papers became available in 2004, their contents gave no indication of a dis-
cernible change in the Justices’ behavior after Marshall’s papers were made public 
in 1993. Furthermore, in the Senate hearing that followed the opening of the Mar-
shall papers, Dennis Hutchinson in particular pointed out that earlier publications 
such as The Brethren and Alpheus T. Mason’s biography of Justice Stone, which 
liberally quoted still-sitting Justices, did not seem to chill the court’s internal func-
tions.106 Without evidence of a chilling effect, we are left with little beyond the 
 103. Koops et al., supra note 99, at 567. 
 104. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, June 7, 
1993, reprinted in Senate Hearing, supra note 16, at 71. 
 105. An issue raised occasionally in discussions about the Justices’ papers is the applicability 
of the attorney work product privilege. The privilege for attorney work product applies to documents 
prepared in anticipation of litigation, protecting an attorney’s notes, drafts, plans, and other docu-
ments that reflect the attorney’s thought processes and ideas regarding the litigation. The privilege 
means that these documents either do not have to be turned over to opposing counsel or can be 
redacted before being shared in discovery. It does not apply to the papers of the Justices or any other 
judge as they are not preparing to represent a client in a litigation and concerns about fairness in 
discovery are irrelevant.
 106. Testimony of Dennis J. Hutchinson, Editor, Supreme Court Review, Senate Hearing, 
supra note 16, at 19. 
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Justices’ insistence that their work must be kept confidential and no explanation as 
to why. 
¶65 In a 1994 article, following the tempest surrounding the Marshall papers, 
Harold M. Hyman, law professor and president of the American Society for Legal 
History, wrote, “The Court’s secrecy tradition endures in part perhaps because, 
historically, many Justices dislike revelations that what they do is part of governing. 
Marshall’s notes suggest that the Court’s conference committee sessions reflect 
many of the tensions exhibited also in the White House and Congress.”107 Yet, as 
Hyman also points out, “[i]t has been a long time since scholarly Court-watchers 
believed, or justices asserted, that the Court’s decisions resulted only from dispas-
sionate philosophical consistencies or clashing convictions about the intentions of 
the Constitution’s framers.”108 Scholarship in the years since Hyman wrote has 
made it only more apparent that the Supreme Court is a politicized governing 
body.109 
Supreme Court Clerks’ Privacy Interests
¶66 The Justices’ clerks have their own privacy concerns. The Justices’ working 
papers include materials written by their clerks. These men and women are not 
public figures to the extent the Justices are, though quite a few go on to be public 
figures later in their careers. Furthermore, the clerks tend to be young and likely to 
still be professionally active, perhaps at the height of their careers, when the Jus-
tices’ papers are finally made available. Do the judicial clerks have a privacy interest 
in the memos and other materials they produce in the Justices’ chambers? Will the 
clerks feel less free to express themselves if they know their work will be publically 
scrutinized later in their careers? 
¶67 A memo regarding Brown v. Board of Education written by then-clerk Wil-
liam Rehnquist to Justice Robert Jackson is one example. In this memo, which was 
in Justice Jackson’s collection of papers, Rehnquist wrote that he believed the Plessy 
decision upholding “separate but equal” was correct and should be reaffirmed. This 
memo and the views expressed therein were raised at Rehnquist’s confirmation 
hearings when he was nominated to the Supreme Court by Richard Nixon, though 
obviously it did not stop the confirmation.110 Elena Kagan also had to field ques-
tions about materials written while she was a clerk for Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall.111 Although their Supreme Court memos were still unavailable, John Roberts 
and Samuel Alito were questioned about memos written in other federal govern-
ment positions.112  
 107. Harold M. Hyman, The Marshall Papers: Community of Interest or Conflict on Capitol 
Hill?, Persp. Hist., May 1994, at 7, 8.
 108. Id. at 7.
 109. See supra ¶¶ 27–34.
 110. See Brad Snyder & John Q. Barrett, Rehnquist’s Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk’s 
1955 Thoughts on Justice Jackson and Brown, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 631, 632–34 (2012). 
 111. Robert Barnes, Kagan Nomination Focuses Attention on Court Clerkships; Relevance of 
Earlier Work Debated, Wash. Post, June 14, 2010, at A15. 
 112. Amy Goldstein, Democrats Dissect Memos from 1980s; Nominee Attempts to Create 
Distance, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 2005, at A13; Amy Goldstein & Charles Babington, Alito Stresses “Rule 
of Law” in Opening Statement; Senate Questioning of Supreme Court Pick Begins Today, Wash. Post, 
Jan. 10, 2006, at A1. 
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¶68 It can be argued that these sorts of revelations and questions regarding the 
work of Supreme Court clerks are reason to limit access to Justices’ papers. Likely, 
then-nominee Rehnquist might have wished that Justice Jackson’s papers had been 
unavailable or that his younger self had been more circumspect, yet there is a cer-
tain fairness to the idea that those who want to hold the most influential judgeships 
in the nation should be accountable for the words they used as clerks—words writ-
ten in a professional setting by government employees who are already elite and 
powerful members of society with significant influence on our legal system and 
who are on a well-established trajectory to become even more elite and powerful. It 
seems strange, then, that we might harbor deep concern for the privacy of the 
Supreme Court clerks when it comes to the work they produce in the course of their 
employment in the chambers simply because their work now resides among the 
Justices’ papers. Furthermore, it is hard to maintain that access to Justice Jackson’s 
papers was destructive or would have a chilling effect on other clerks when 
Rehnquist not only won Senate confirmation in 1972 but also was later elevated to 
Chief Justice.
¶69 Also, any chilling effect from fear of future scrutiny would have to be small 
because future access is already a very strong likelihood; the fear, if it is a concern, 
should already be present. When a clerk accepts an offer from a Supreme Court 
Justice, he knows that he is agreeing to do governmental work of profound public 
interest, much as a Justice does. He also knows that his work will be among the 
Justice’s papers and that the Justice can do anything she wants with those papers, 
including releasing them immediately upon retirement. If the clerk is concerned 
about his words coming back to haunt him in the future, the current regime should 
be plenty chilling. The clerks already have very little privacy within their control 
when it comes to their work for the Court. 
¶70 It is also arguable that some chilling effect might not be all bad. We want 
those advising our top jurists to speak freely but, at the same time, the American 
people are not well served if those advisers extol extreme views. To the extent that 
chilling occurs, it may serve to prevent extremism. Supreme Court clerks are intel-
ligent and talented enough to present the full panoply of views and legal options 
without taking such extreme views that would later prove embarrassing. This cir-
cles back to the Rehnquist memo and the notion that if extreme views are being 
expressed by Supreme Court clerks, it is best for our democracy if the American 
public knows this.
Shifting From Privacy to Public Policy
¶71 In the end, given that the Justices and their clerks are government employ-
ees with remarkable influence and that the American public has a strong interest in 
the workings of our government, privacy cannot justify the level of control the 
Justices have been exercising. The concept of privacy is a distraction and allows far 
too much idiosyncrasy. As evidenced by the Freedom of Information Act and the 
Presidential Records Act,113 public policy can be used to protect the deliberative 
processes of government for a time while still allowing for access to information 
 113. The Presidential Records Act has a mixed record of success and provides more loop-
holes and exceptions than it should, but it is an improvement on the situation regarding presidential 
papers that existed prior to its 1981 effective date.
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that will enlighten the public and provide accountability. As Hyman asks, “Is the 
United States Supreme Court so fragile or vulnerable that researchers’ access to 
Justices’ notes of conference committee proceedings will damage this vital institu-
tion? The Supreme Court is a marble palace. But it should not be and has no means 
to be a self-quarantined intellectual fortress.”114 
Proposals for Improvement
¶72 What options exist that would address these concerns?
“Public Papers” as Public Property
¶73 Congress could pass a law changing the ownership of the Justices’ papers as 
recommended by the Public Documents Commission in 1977. As described 
above,115 the commission recommended distinguishing three categories of records 
created by all federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices: federal records, 
public papers, and personal papers. Personal papers—those that deal with personal 
matters rather than work for the courts—would remain private property. Public 
papers—the working papers of the chambers (e.g., conference notes, memos, inter- 
and intra-chamber correspondence, opinion drafts)—would become public prop-
erty subject to retention, preservation, and access requirements. 
¶74 The commission did recognize the interest in shielding Justices and any 
ongoing matters before the Court from immediate blowback, allowing for the 
records to be closed for up to fifteen years following the individual’s retirement 
from the bench.116 As Kathryn Watts notes, a floor as well as a ceiling would be 
prudent in light of the Justices’ reactions to the release of the Marshall papers, 
which occurred long after the commission’s report. A window of no fewer than ten 
years and no more than twenty would allow the Justices, and others represented in 
the collections, a long stretch of confidentiality and would ensure that no matters 
discussed in the papers were still in front of the Court. After twenty years, access 
restrictions would be allowed only on materials the discourse of which would “con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.”117
¶75 The commission based its fifteen-year recommendation on retirement 
from the bench, not death. This is the more sustainable approach from an archival 
standpoint because the release date is known when the collection is given rather 
than being indeterminate. Obviously, a Justice could die while still on the bench, as 
did Justice Scalia, but a release date would still be definite. The ten- to twenty-year 
window recommended here should be based on retirement rather than death. 
¶76 This first proposal faces a few very high hurdles. Congress does not seem 
interested in such legislation. It has ignored the Public Documents Commission’s 
recommendations for forty years, even after the Senate revisited the matter in 1993 
and reached many of the same conclusions. It would be politically difficult, to say 
the least, for lawmakers to pass legislation changing the ownership of judicial 
papers while leaving unchanged the ownership of their own papers. It would likely 
 114. Hyman, supra note 106, at 10.
 115. See supra ¶ 36.
 116. See Commission Final Report, supra note 21, at 41.
 117. Id. 
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take a Supreme Court scandal on the scale of Watergate to garner the will to make 
such a change happen, and the Supreme Court is largely scandal-free. 
¶77 It may be constitutionally difficult as well. Given the separation of powers 
doctrine, Congress would have to overcome questions about its constitutional abil-
ity to regulate the judicial branch of government. That said, Congress has been 
allowed to regulate the executive branch, but that was accomplished in the wake of 
Watergate. Also, the Supreme Court’s interests in the disposition of presidential 
papers align with the interests of Congress in favor of public access. As for the Jus-
tices’ papers, however, there is and has been no scandal or corruption to prompt 
reform, and when the Justices’ confidentiality is at stake, their interests run counter 
to any interest the Congress has in preservation and access. 
¶78 Another concern is expense. Public ownership would mean taking on the 
full cost of retaining, preserving, processing, and storing the Justices’ papers. This 
would be expensive. As Watts points out, a change in ownership status by law could 
also result in a taking.118 This could add compensation to the cost for several 
decades. 
Congress Changes Ownership Status Only; Judicial Branch Works Out Details 
¶79 Professor Watts proposes that Congress pass a law changing the ownership 
status of the Justices’ papers to public while leaving the details about preservation 
and access up to the judicial branch to determine for itself. This is an appealing 
option in that it would accomplish the underlying goal regarding ownership while 
not alienating the Justices nor infringing quite so far on the separation of powers 
doctrine. After all, Watts argues, the PRA has not been found to violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.119 
¶80 As noted above, however, when the PRA was written, the political interests 
of Congress and the Supreme Court were aligned in the aftermath of the Watergate 
scandal. In the case of the working papers of the Justices, those interests will be at 
odds instead. In the end, the question of the constitutionality of a statute changing 
the ownership status of the Justices’ papers will be decided by the Supreme Court 
itself. The same holds for the question of whether such a law would constitute a 
taking. How likely is the Court to uphold such a law? 
¶81 Watts’s proposal also does not envision any enforcement. Imagine a sce-
nario in which a majority of the Court finds the law constitutional, but a disagree-
ing Justice does not wish to comply. What enforcement mechanism could we pos-
sibly want? If we could settle on a fine high enough to force compliance, would that 
be a positive resolution? History has already shown us that the PRA is difficult to 
enforce and subject to back-and-forth executive orders.120 Trying to enforce an 
ownership change against reluctant Justices is not going to be any easier. 
 118. See Watts, supra note 26, at 1714–15.
 119. Watts points out the separation of powers doctrine did not stop the passage of the PRA, 
urging that perhaps it is less of an issue than might be presumed. Id. at 1718.
 120. See id. at 1716–17; Wendy Ginsberg, Cong. Research Serv., R40238, The Presidential 
Records Act: Background and Recent Issues for Congress (2014).
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Incentives for Complete Collections and Short Embargos
¶82 Given the difficulties posed by the public ownership solutions, is there a 
more tenable alternative? A program to provide grants to support donated collec-
tions in return for shorter embargo periods may be a viable answer.
¶83 When Justices select archives for their papers, they select institutions they 
trust to process and maintain the collection. Processing and storing a collection 
typical of a modern Supreme Court Justice requires significant resources on the 
part of the institution, which may or may not receive financial help from the family. 
To ease this burden and incentivize the appropriate retention of Justices’ papers, 
Congress can establish a program to grant funds to institutions that receive a major 
collection of papers from a Justice. In donating his or her papers, a Justice is then 
giving the institution both the collection and funds to help process and store the 
documents. 
¶84 Under this scheme, the amount of the grant would depend on meeting 
conditions such as minimum number of linear feet and a standard of comprehen-
siveness. The grant should also encourage a short embargo period. For instance, a 
collection that is made public in ten to fifteen years after donation could result in 
a $1 million grant for the repository, while a fifteen- to twenty-year embargo would 
result in only $500,000. This would give institutions an incentive in advising the 
Justice as to the advantages of a shorter embargo and, for a Justice wanting to sup-
port the institution as well as cement a legacy, provide a tangible reason to accept.121 
¶85 Clearly, this niche program would be invoked rarely since there are rela-
tively few Supreme Court Justices. In that sense, the program would be inexpen-
sive, averaging well under $1 million per year. Yet it would encourage Justices and 
institutions to move to shorter embargos and provide much-needed funding for 
processing the collections that are donated. The small price tag should help make 
it politically palatable.
¶86 This proposal also eases separation of powers concerns by allowing the 
Justices to eschew the program entirely; participation would not be required. 
Instead, participation would be incentivized monetarily and, over time, through 
reputation. One can see a future in which a Justice who refuses the program in 
order to place more restrictive access requirements would seem miserly.122 It would 
also remove the risk of creating a situation in which a taking has occurred. 
¶87 The incentive-only structure would also allow members of Congress to 
avoid the political discomfort of regulating access to the Justices’ papers while 
ignoring their own. In supporting this proposal, a congressperson can point to the 
limited number of Justices, the relative importance of their papers, and the logisti-
 121. The graduated plan also acknowledges that shorter embargo periods require faster 
processing of the collection, which in turn requires more money. 
 122. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Down the Memory Hole, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2009, at A31; 
Tony Mauro, Souter Blocks Access to His Papers for 50 Years, The BLT: The Blog of LegalTimes (Aug. 
26, 2009), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/08/souter-blocks-access-to-his-papers-for-50 
-years.html [https://perma.cc/9H5U-UKR7]. Each of these articles implies or states that Justice 
Souter’s papers will open fifty years after his retirement. It is, in fact, to be fifty years after his death. 
See Tony Mauro, The Long Wait for Souter’s Papers, LegalTimes, Apr. 22, 2015, at 18. This has been 
independently confirmed by the New Hampshire Historical Society. Telephone interview with Wesley 
Balla, Director of Collections & Exhibitions, N.H. Historical Soc’y (July 13, 2017). 
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cal and fiscal infeasibility of a similar program to preserve the papers of the many 
members of Congress as reasons to leave the status of their own papers alone. 
Archive and Library Guidelines
¶88 Regardless of the likelihood of any of the foregoing proposals, archivists and 
librarians can make a difference by developing specific recommendations for judi-
cial papers. The Library of Congress and several leading educational institutions 
already hold multiple collections and are likely to be asked to accept more in the 
future. If we, as a profession, had preservation and access guidelines specifically 
geared toward judicial papers, the librarians at these institutions, and smaller ones 
as well, could use these guidelines to urge donors to adopt more predictable time-
tables (e.g., retirement rather than death), a definite embargo period window (e.g., 
ten to twenty years), and equal access (e.g., no exclusive access to designated 
researchers).123 
¶89 We can also make such guidelines applicable beyond Supreme Court Jus-
tices. Concerns regarding preservation and access apply to other federal judges as 
well as to state judges, particularly state supreme court justices. The guidelines 
could be used to inform decisions made about collections from other public offi-
cials such as legislators, governors, and mayors. Not only would this enhance the 
utility of the recommendations to more libraries, but it could well result in greater 
adoption that would create new norms among our jurists and politicians. In short, 
if the Justices and other prominent public servants received the same advice from 
every professional librarian and archivist they talked to, we could start to change 
the narrative surrounding access to their papers. 
Conclusion
¶90 Open government advocate Steven Aftergood has written, “Ensuring 
appropriate public access to government information, while establishing proper 
boundaries around the exercise of official secrecy, has proved to be an elusive 
goal.”124 Although Aftergood was referring to the confidentiality system, his words 
apply to the Justices’ papers as well. Thanks to the continuation of the private own-
ership model, an appropriate balance between access and secrecy has indeed eluded 
us. The current regime weighs more heavily toward secrecy than access even 
though the working papers of the Supreme Court Justices are of profound interest 
and importance to researchers and to the American public. 
¶91 Archivists and librarians have been struggling with the tension between 
public access and donor privacy for decades.125 The scholarship around this subject 
 123. The guidelines, which should mirror the suggestions made above for the incentive 
program, could be generalized to apply to other federal and state judges as well. Not only would this 
enhance their utility to more libraries, but it could well result in greater adoption that would create 
new norms among our jurists. 
 124. Aftergood, supra note 32, at 399.
 125. See, e.g, Privacy and Confidentiality Perspectives (Menzi L. Behrnd-Klodt & Peter 
J. Wosh eds., 2005); Marybeth Gaudette, Playing Fair with the Right to Privacy, 28 Archival Issues 21 
(2003); Mark A. Greene, Moderation in Everything, Access in Nothing?: Opinions About Access Restric-
tions on Private Papers, 18 Archival Issues 31 (1993); Hodson, supra note 30, at 194; Schwarz, supra 
note 24, at 179; Paul J. Sillitoe, Privacy in a Public Place: Managing Public Access to Personal Informa-
tion Controlled by Archives Services, 19 J. Soc’y Archivists 5 (1998).  
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reveals that archivists generally try to walk a fine line between acquiescing to a 
donor’s wishes and encouraging a donor to either (1) do more to protect the pri-
vacy of third-party authors—typically correspondents of the donor—represented 
in the collection or, as is the issue with Supreme Court Justices, (2) place fewer 
restrictions on access to facilitate research, scholarship, and public understand-
ing.126 As long as the Justices’ papers remain private property, archivists and librar-
ians are limited to direct advocacy. We can encourage donors to provide as much 
access as possible within a reasonable time. We can communicate that archival 
professional ethics state that access should be equal for all researchers,127 and that 
if any part of the collection is to be restricted, it should be restricted to all research-
ers equally.128 We can advocate for definitive opening dates rather than restrictions 
of indeterminate duration.129 We can inform donors that placing onerous restric-
tions on an archive can lead to inequitable access, incomplete and speculative 
research, decoy requests,130 and inconsistencies. We can communicate that reason-
able access leaves a better impression than excessive restriction.
¶92 Given the importance and politicization of the Supreme Court, a Justice’s 
service to the public does not end the moment he or she retires. Rather, it includes 
enabling the public to examine and understand how the Justice performed his or 
her duties on the Court. Most of the Justices understand this, but many of them 
make choices that unnecessarily restrict public access for too long. A workable 
resolution to the dilemma posed by a history of private ownership, a tradition of 
secrecy, and a need for public access is not easy to find. Librarians and archivists 
are well versed in these balancing acts and have much to contribute to the search 
for a better solution. 
 126. See, e.g., Panofsky & Moir, supra note 27. 
 127. Danielson, supra note 29, at 60–62, discusses potential problems with open archives 
as they place burdens on archivists/librarians as arbiters. For example, if an archivist has open, equal-
access archives and receives help requests from both an undergraduate and a celebrated historian, to 
which person does the archivist give his or her limited time? Should an archivist keep materials with 
high scholarly value in reserve for reputable scholars and away from “hacks”? What if the library is a 
publisher as well? This can lead to conflicts with researchers. 
 128. According to the ALA-SAA Joint Statement on Access to Research Materials in 
Archives and Special Collections Libraries, 
It is the responsibility of a repository (1) to make available original research materials (2) in its 
possession on equal terms of access. . . . A repository should not deny any researcher access to 
materials, nor grant privileged or exclusive use of materials to any researcher, nor conceal the exis-
tence of any body of materials from any researcher, unless required to do so by law, institutional 
access policy, or donor or purchase stipulation. . . . Repositories must be committed to preserving 
research materials and to making them available for research as quickly as practical following 
their acquisition. 
ALA/SAA Joint Statement on Access to Research Materials in Archives and Special Collections Librar-
ies, Soc’y of Am. Archivists (June 1, 2009), https://www2.archivists.org/statements/alasaa-joint 
-statement-on-access-to-research-materials-in-archives-and-special-collection [https://perma.cc/PY6U 
-UAP2].
 129. Heather MacNeil, Information Privacy, Liberty, and Democracy, in Privacy and Con-
fidentiality Perspectives, supra note 30, at 67, 78–79.
 130. Decoy requests occur when a scholar likely to be granted access requests materials but 
is secretly doing so on behalf of someone who would not have been given access on his or her own 
merit. See Danielson, supra note 29, at 57.
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Appendix
Donations and Access Restrictions on Most Significant Collection  
of Papers for Justices Serving on the Court During and Since 1900
Notes: In almost all cases, the largest collection was selected for this line of inquiry. Exceptions 
were made if a smaller collection held material relevant to the Justice’s time on the Court or if 
two collections were equally important. In many instances, the actual papers have been filmed, 
and access is granted to microform only. The concern in this instance is access to the content, 
rather than a particular format, so this restriction to microfilm is not noted. 
Justice Supreme Court Tenure Disposition of Judicial Papers
John Marshall Harlan 1877–1911 Justice Harlan’s papers were donated to the Library 
of Congress without restrictions in 1958, forty-seven 
years after he left the Court in 1911. 
Horace Gray 1881–1902 Originals of Justice Gray’s papers, which consist 
mostly of congratulatory letters, were donated by his 
family to the Supreme Court Library in 1948, forty-six 
years after Justice Gray died while still serving on the 
Court. The papers are now held by the Supreme Court 
curator. There were no restrictions on the donation. 
Microform copies were made for the Library of Con-
gress in the early 1950s and have been available to 
researchers since that time. 
Melville Weston Fuller 1888–1910 Chief Justice Fuller’s papers were donated to the 
Library of Congress without restriction in 1978, sixty-
eight years after Chief Justice Fuller left the Court in 
1910.
David Josiah Brewer 1889–1910 Yale University Sterling Memorial Library holds the 
Brewer Family papers, which were donated by family 
members between 1951 and 1965, more than forty 
years after his time on the Court ended. It appears 
that no restrictions were ever placed on the donation. 
Henry Billings Brown 1890–1906 Detroit Public Library holds Justice Brown’s collection, 
which came from various donors with no restrictions.
George Shiras, Jr. 1892–1903 If any of Justice Shiras’s papers are still in existence, 
they are thought to be in the hands of his heirs.
Rufus Wheeler Peckham 1895–1909 Justice Peckham’s papers are in the Wheeler H. Peck-
ham archive at the Library of Congress. Very few deal 
with his time on the Supreme Court. The collection 
was donated in 1967, fifty-eight years after Peckham 
left the Court, with no restrictions.  
Joseph McKenna 1898–1925 Justice McKenna’s papers were destroyed. The few 
that may remain are thought to be in the hands of his 
heirs.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr.
1902–1932 The bulk of the Oliver Wendell Holmes papers were 
donated to Harvard Law School in 1948 by Methyl 
Palfrey, wife of Holmes’s executor, John G. Palfrey. 
This donation came sixteen years after Justice Holmes 
retired from the Court. Harvard Law received addi-
tional donations of Holmes’s papers and related 
materials from other donors. 
William Rufus Day 1903–1922 Justice Day donated his papers to the Library of 
Congress in 1960, thirty-eight years after he left the 
Court, with no restrictions. 
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Justice Supreme Court Tenure Disposition of Judicial Papers
William Henry Moody 1906–1910 The Library of Congress purchased two collections 
of letters written by Justice Moody, who retired from 
the Court in 1910. These purchases occurred in 1936 
and 1952. No restrictions were placed on these acces-
sions. 
Horace Harmon Lurton 1909–1914 Justice Lurton’s papers were donated to the Library 
of Congress in 1957, forty-three years after he left the 
Court, with no restrictions. 
Charles Evans Hughes 1910–1941 Early deposits of papers in the Library of Congress 
occurred in 1933–1934. The bulk of the collection was 
deposited in the Library of Congress in 1941; access 
was restricted to those given Hughes’s written per-
mission. This collection and additional papers were 
gifted to the library in 1951, but access remained 
restricted to family members and assignees for 
twenty-five years or until all those designated as such 
died. However, the family released all restrictions on 
the papers in 1974. 
Joseph Rucker Lamar 1910–1916 University of Georgia received Justice Lamar’s papers 
as a gift from Lamar’s wife in 1938, twenty-two years 
after Lamar’s service on the Court ended, with no 
restrictions.
Willis Van Devanter 1910–1937 Papers were first deposited with the Library of Con-
gress in 1960, twenty-three years after Van Devanter 
left the Court. Van Devanter died in 1941, so the 
donor was likely a family member. The papers were 
restricted for ten years or until the donor’s death, 
though access could be granted upon request. The 
papers were thus unrestricted by 1970, thirty-three 
years after Van Devanter left the Court. The papers 
were then gifted to the Library of Congress in 1980 
and remain free of access restrictions. 
Edward Douglass White 1910–1921 Chief Justice White’s papers were destroyed. Three 
items are at Louisiana State University.
Mahlon Pitney 1912–1922 Pitney’s papers from his time at the Court are thought 
to have been destroyed. The Pitney family papers are 
held at the New Jersey Historical Society but are not 
particularly relevant to Justice Pitney’s service on the 
Court. 
James Clark McReynolds 1914–1941 Papers were given to the University of Virginia Alder-
man Library (later transferred to the university’s 
Arthur J. Morris Law Library) in the early 1950s by Jus-
tice McReynolds’s nephew. Correspondence between 
Justice McReynolds and his brother was restricted for 
at least ten years, and longer if the “contemporaries” 
were still living, as it was deemed too personal for 
contemporaneous public scrutiny. 
Louis Dembitz Brandeis 1916–1939 Many of Justice Brandeis’s papers were given to the 
University of Louisville. There is some indication 
that these papers (or perhaps only those given after 
Brandeis’s death in 1941) were closed during the 
lifetime of Bernard Flexner, a friend of Brandeis who 
made arrangements for Brandeis’s donation with 
the university. Flexner died in 1945, six years after 
Brandeis left the Court. 
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Justice Supreme Court Tenure Disposition of Judicial Papers
John Hessin Clarke 1916–1922 Papers were bequeathed to Case Western Reserve 
University in Justice Clarke’s will with no restrictions. 
William Howard Taft 1921–1930 Deposit of the Taft papers with the Library of Con-
gress began in 1919, several years after the end of 
his presidency. Further papers were deposited over 
the next fifteen years, and smaller deposits came 
later. Early access was allowed only by permis-
sion. The papers were then gifted to the library in 
1952, although access was restricted to family and 
researchers receiving family permission until 1960 at 
the latest (restrictions could be relaxed earlier if the 
family so chose or if the donating family members 
died). 
Pierce Butler 1922–1939 Justice Butler’s papers are part of the Butler family 
collection at the Minnesota Historical Society. The 
collection was donated in the early 1990s by a family 
member. The papers will remain closed, except by 
permission of a named descendant of the donor, until 
seven years after the death of this named descen-
dant. The named descendant is to appoint a proxy for 
granting permission in the seven-year period follow-
ing the descendant’s death. 
George Sutherland 1922–1938 The Sutherland papers were donated to the Library 
of Congress without restriction in 1959, twenty-one 
years after he left the Court. 
Edward Terry Sanford 1923–1930 Justice Sanford’s papers were given to the University 
of Tennessee (originally given to the Law Library, but 
now held in Special Collections) prior to 1960 (how 
much prior is unknown) by a descendant of Justice 
Sanford. There were no restrictions, but the donor did 
reserve the right to reclaim anything from the collec-
tion.   
Harlan Fiske Stone 1925–1946 Chief Justice Stone’s papers were given to the Library 
of Congress in 1949, but were not processed until 
1975. Presumably, they were effectively unavailable 
for those twenty-six years, but were then without 
restriction. 
Owen Josephus Roberts 1930–1945 Justice Roberts’s judicial papers were destroyed. The 
Library of Congress holds a small collection of corre-
spondence related to his appointment that has never 
been restricted. 
Benjamin Nathan  
Cardozo
1932–1938 Justice Cardozo’s papers were bequeathed to Colum-
bia University with no restrictions. However, accord-
ing to the National Study Commission Final Report, 
most of Cardozo’s Supreme Court working papers 
were destroyed. 
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Justice Supreme Court Tenure Disposition of Judicial Papers
Hugo Lafayette Black 1937–1971 Justice Black’s conference notes were allegedly 
destroyed. The Library of Congress holds other Black 
papers, a gift made in 1973. A ten-year restriction was 
imposed on non-Supreme Court papers, with excep-
tions for family and those with permission. Access 
to Supreme Court files was to be restricted until the 
retirement or death (whichever came first) of all those 
who participated in the case or were active members 
of the Court at the time of the decision. The family 
decided to start taking requests for access from the 
public in 1985. In 2004, thirty-three years after Justice 
Black’s death and departure from the Court, the col-
lection became available without restrictions (with 
the exception of a single letter).
Stanley Forman Reed 1938–1957 Justice Reed’s papers were given to the University 
of Kentucky. Nothing was to be released and no 
publicity allowed until cataloging was complete and 
a review conducted by the Reed family. Documents 
relating to specific Supreme Court decisions were not 
released until all members of the Court at the time 
of decision died; the last of these would have been 
Justice Brennan, who died in 1997, forty years after 
Justice Reed’s time on the Court ended. Documents 
relating to any specific individual on the Court were 
not released until the death of that individual. Docu-
ments embarrassing to Justice Reed or his family can 
be withdrawn. 
William Orville Douglas 1939–1975 Justice Douglas’s papers were deposited with the 
Library of Congress beginning in 1960. This collection 
was restricted during his lifetime to those granted 
permission by Douglas only. When he died in 1980, 
the collection converted to a gift and was opened to 
the public. Further Douglas papers arrived after his 
death. These were restricted for five years and then 
opened to researchers in May 1985, with the excep-
tion of three boxes that remain closed by request of 
the donor and some material deemed confidential 
under federal rules. 
Felix Frankfurter 1939–1962 Justice Frankfurter’s non-Supreme Court papers 
were given to the Library of Congress in 1955 with 
the restriction that no item would be released until 
sixteen years after the date it was created. This was 
later changed to a restriction that expired upon Frank-
furter’s death, which occurred in 1965.
Harvard holds Justice Frankfurter’s Supreme Court 
papers under a bequest in his will, though the bulk of 
the papers were received in 1962, prior to his death. 
Smaller portions of the papers came later. They were 
originally closed except to scholars who were given 
specific permission from a two- to three-person review 
board composed of friends/colleagues of Frankfurter 
(this restriction seems to have been created by Harvard 
Law School personnel and Frankfurter’s longtime sec-
retary rather than in the deed of gift). It is not known 
exactly when this review board requirement ended, 
but probably no later than 1992 when Professor Paul 
Freund, one of the reviewers, died. 
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Justice Supreme Court Tenure Disposition of Judicial Papers
Frank Murphy 1940–1949 The bulk of Justice Murphy’s papers were gifted to the 
University of Michigan by the Justice’s brother in 1961 
and 1965. Additions from other sources were acquired 
throughout the 1960s. By stipulation of the donor, 
access was, and still is, restricted to “bona fide schol-
ars” who must sign a contract regarding appropriate 
use of the papers. Researchers without a Ph.D. must 
justify their need for the papers, provide references 
from professors, and be granted approval by the 
director of the university’s Bentley Historical Library.  
James Francis Byrnes 1941–1942 The Byrnes papers were given to Clemson Univer-
sity between 1962 and 1981. No restrictions were 
attached. 
Robert Houghwout  
Jackson
1941–1954 Justice Jackson’s papers were in the possession of a 
single scholar with absolute discretion over access 
following Jackson’s death. The family then donated 
the papers to the Library of Congress in 1985, thirty-
one years after Jackson’s death.  
Wiley Blount Rutledge 1943–1949 The Rutledge papers were given to the Library of Con-
gress in 1980, thirty-one years after his death ended 
his tenure on the Court. They were immediately avail-
able without restriction. 
Harold Hitz Burton 1945–1958 Justice Burton’s papers were given to the Library of 
Congress in 1959 and restricted to Burton himself and 
those with his express permission until his death in 
1964. This changed in 1965 when a second round of 
papers was added to the collection. A few items were 
restricted to Burton’s two sons for twenty-five years 
(1980) or until the death of their mother, whichever 
came first. Mrs. Burton died in 1970, and the collec-
tion was opened fully at that time.
Frederick Moore Vinson 1946–1953 Chief Justice Vinson’s papers were given to the Uni-
versity of Kentucky. His Supreme Court files remained 
closed, except by permission from the family, until 
after the deaths of Justices Tom C. Clark, William O. 
Douglas, and Stanley F. Reed. This occurred in 1980, 
twenty-seven years after Vinson’s death ended his 
tenure on the Court. 
Tom Campbell Clark 1949–1967 Justice Clark’s papers were given to the University of 
Texas Tarlton Law Library by his wife in 1977 with no 
restrictions. This meant a delay of only ten years. 
Sherman Minton 1949–1956 Justice Minton’s papers were given to the Harry S. 
Truman Library in 1957 and 1959 with instructions 
that the U.S. Archivist was to review and seal all 
items relating to (1) private and family business of 
Minton or his correspondents, (2) investigations or 
appointments of individuals, (3) statements made in 
confidence, and (4) anything else that might be used 
to harass or damage any living person. Sealed items 
were to be reviewed from time to time to determine 
whether restriction was no longer required. Access is 
now open. 
According to the National Study Commission, most of 
Justice Minton’s Supreme Court working papers were 
destroyed.
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Earl Warren 1953–1969 The Warren papers were placed in the Library of Con-
gress in 1969 and restricted to those with Warren’s 
permission or that of an assignee until 1985. Access 
has been unrestricted since January 1985, sixteen 
years after his retirement. Some non-Supreme Court 
papers remain classified.
John Marshall Harlan II 1955–1971 Justice Harlan’s papers were given to Princeton Uni-
versity in 1972 and 1974. They were restricted from all 
use except by permission of Harlan’s daughter until 
July 8, 1979, with a possible one-year extension of the 
restriction. Financial records in the collection were 
closed until July 8, 1982. 
Later correspondence suggests that the family 
inquired about extending the restriction on case 
files for cases “handled during the period present 
members were sitting on the Court,” but there is no 
indication in the archival records as to whether this 
was actually done. 
William Joseph  
Brennan, Jr.
1956–1990 Brennan began giving his papers to the Library of 
Congress in 1967, and his access restrictions were 
complicated. Case histories and legal files were to 
be closed until three years after Brennan’s death 
or the death of the last surviving Justice involved in 
the case/decision, whichever came later, but not to 
exceed fifteen years after Brennan’s death. Corre-
spondence was to open twenty years after his death. 
Upon Brennan’s death in 1997, it was determined that 
case histories and some post-1985 case files would 
remain closed until July 24, 2000, three years after 
his death. His correspondence opened on July 24, 
2017, twenty years after his death.
Charles Evans Whittaker 1957–1962 Disposition unknown. 
Potter Stewart 1958–1981 Yale University holds the Potter Stewart papers. They 
were restricted until all members who served with 
Stewart retired. Justice Stevens was the last of these, 
thus the Stewart papers opened in 2010, twenty-nine 
years after he left the Court.  
Arthur Joseph Goldberg 1962–1965 Both Northwestern University and the Library of 
Congress now have substantial collections of Justice 
Goldberg’s papers, but they had been in Goldberg’s 
possession for more than twenty years after he left 
the Court in 1965. The agreement giving the papers 
to the Library of Congress was signed in 1988, with 
additional accessions between 1992 and 2002 fol-
lowing Goldberg’s death in 1990. None of these gifts 
were ever restricted, but because the gifts came so 
long after his time on the Court, his papers were 
effectively unavailable for research for twenty-five 
years or more.  
The collection at Northwestern University was 
donated in 1996 by the Justice’s children. Evidence 
indicates that it was also given without any restric-
tions. 
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Byron Raymond White 1962–1993 The Library of Congress was gifted Justice White’s 
papers in 1988 with access restricted to White alone. 
The papers were then to remain completely closed for 
ten years after his death, which occurred in 2002. The 
collection opened in 2012, nineteen years after his 
retirement. 
Abe Fortas 1965–1969 Justice Fortas’s papers were given to Yale University’s 
Sterling Memorial Library by Fortas in 1974 and Carolyn 
E. Agger Fortas in 1988 and 1991. These papers were 
closed to researchers until 2000, thirty-one years after 
his retirement, except with the written authorization 
of the donor or donor’s designee.  On January 1, 2000, 
the papers were opened to researchers. 
An anonymous donor made a further contribution in 
2012. 
Thurgood Marshall 1967–1991 Justice Marshall’s papers are held at Library of Con-
gress. They were closed during Marshall’s lifetime 
but opened shortly after his death. The deed of gift 
used the language “at the discretion of the Library”; 
conversations between the Librarian of Congress and 
Justice Marshall indicated that the Justice wanted no 
moratorium. 
Warren Earl Burger 1969–1986 William & Mary Law Library holds the Burger papers. 
They are closed until 2026, forty years after his retire-
ment, as instructed in the deed of gift. 
Harry Andrew Blackmun 1970–1994 Justice Blackmun donated his papers to the the 
Library of Congress in 1997 with access restricted to 
Blackmun and those obtaining his permission. Upon 
his death in 1999, the duty to grant permission passed 
to an assignee for five years. The collection opened for 
public research without restriction in 2004. Although 
this resulted in a delay of only ten years, this was not 
a foregone conclusion since the time period depended 
on the date of Justice Blackmun’s death.   
Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr. 1972–1987 Justice Powell’s papers are held by Washington & Lee 
University’s School of Law. Powell’s Supreme Court 
files were closed, except by permission, until all 
members who served with the Justice left the bench. 
Justice Scalia, who died in 2016, was the last of 
these, so Justice Powell’s Supreme Court files opened 
twenty-nine years after his retirement. 
William Hubbs Rehnquist 1972–2005 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s papers are held at the 
Hoover Institute. His Supreme Court papers are open-
ing on a rolling basis as his colleagues on the Court 
die. They are currently closed from 1975 on, as Justice 
Stevens joined the Court in 1975. Upon Stevens’s 
passing, Rehnquist’s papers through September 
1981, when Justice O’Connor joined the Court, will 
open.  
John Paul Stevens 1975–2010 Justice Stevens’s papers are held at the Library of 
Congress and are currently restricted. Access to mate-
rials predating October 1, 2005, will open in October 
2020. Materials from after October 1, 2005, will 
remain closed until 2030. 
220 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 110:2  [2018-8]
Justice Supreme Court Tenure Disposition of Judicial Papers
Sandra Day O’Connor 1981–2006 Justice O’Connor’s papers are, or will be, held at the 
Library of Congress. All case files are closed until all 
members who served with her have retired from the 
bench (no rolling opening). Still to retire are Justices 
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Chief Justice 
Roberts. 
Antonin Scalia 1986–2016 Justice Scalia’s papers have been donated to Harvard 
Law Library. They are completely closed until 2020, at 
which time pre-judicial and general papers will open. 
After 2020, case files will open on a rolling basis as 
those who served on the bench with Scalia die. 
Anthony McLeod  
Kennedy
1988–2018 Disposition unknown
David Hackett Souter 1990–2009 Justice Souter donated his papers to the New Hamp-
shire Historical Society. They will remain closed until 
fifty years after Souter’s death (which means at least 
2068 as Souter is still alive at the time of publication 
in 2018).
Clarence Thomas 1991– Disposition unknown
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 1993– Justice Ginsburg’s papers are, or will be, at the 
Library of Congress. Justice Ginsburg is already tak-
ing requests for materials from before her service on 
the federal bench. Nothing is publically known about 
future access to her judicial papers other than that 
they will be accessible at some point. 
Stephen Gerald Breyer 1994– Disposition unknown
John Glover Roberts, Jr. 2005– Disposition unknown
Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr. 2006– Disposition unknown
Sonia Maria Sotomayor 2009– Disposition unknown
Elena Kagan 2010– Disposition unknown
Neil McGill Gorsuch 2017– Disposition unknown
